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Gell-Mann and Hartle (GMH) have recently considered time-neutral cosmological models in which
the initial and final conditions are independently specified, and several authors have investigated
experimental tests of such models.
We point out here that GMH time-neutral models can allow superluminal signalling, in the sense
that it can be possible for observers in those cosmologies, by detecting and exploiting regularities
in the final state, to construct devices which send and receive signals between space-like separated
points. In suitable cosmologies, any single superluminal message can be transmitted with proba-
bility arbitrarily close to one by the use of redundant signals. However, the outcome probabilities
of quantum measurements generally depend on precisely which past and future measurements take
place. As the transmission of any signal relies on quantum measurements, its transmission proba-
bility is similarly context-dependent. As a result, the standard superluminal signalling paradoxes
do not apply. Despite their unusual features, the models are internally consistent.
These results illustrate an interesting conceptual point. The standard view of Minkowski causality
is not an absolutely indispensable part of the mathematical formalism of relativistic quantum theory.
It is contingent on the empirical observation that naturally occurring ensembles can be naturally
pre-selected but not post-selected.
I. INTRODUCTION
Standard quantum theory is applied in a time asym-
metric way. The physical state of a quantum system is
taken to be completely described by the state vector at
any given time, which is taken to be derivable from past
events. The state vector encodes all the available in-
formation about the future behaviour of the system, al-
lowing probabilistic predictions about the results of any
sequence of possible future measurements.
As Aharonov, Bergmann and Lebowitz (ABL) pointed
out in their classic discussion [1] of time symmetry and
quantum measurement, this time asymmetry derives not
from the formalism of quantum theory but from the way
we construct the statistical ensembles to which the theory
is applied. If ensembles are constructed time symmetri-
cally, using post-selection as well as pre-selection, then
the probability distribution for the outcome of any series
of experiments at intermediate times is time symmetric.
The familiar time asymmetry relies on the assumption
that ensembles on which measurements have unambigu-
ous probability distributions can be constructed via pre-
selection alone. Every test to date supports this assump-
tion, but it remains logically possible that it could be
empirically refuted without necessarily invalidating the
basic formalism of quantum theory.
Recently, Gell-Mann and Hartle (GMH) have proposed
[6] a class of time-neutral cosmological models in which
the initial and final quantum states are fixed indepen-
dently. These models provide a foil against which to test
the standard time asymmetric understanding of cosmol-
ogy. We describe below a property of GMH time-neutral
cosmologies which seems to have gone unnoticed, namely
that it can be possible for observers in these cosmologies
to send superluminal signals.
II. TIME-NEUTRAL COSMOLOGIES:
ASSUMPTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
We consider, for simplicity, observers near one end of
the cosmology, who experience a thermodynamic arrow
of time that is well-defined and unidirectional through-
out space during their era. We assume that the initial
conditions are defined by some low entropy state, and
adopt the observers’ time conventions, referring to past
and future, and to initial and final states, with respect
to their thermodynamic arrow. We suppose that the ob-
servers can readily use present data to make inferences
about past events, and can readily produce ensembles
of quantum systems whose state is defined (or at least
constrained) by a process of pre-selection.
If the final state is also of low entropy, there is no
globally defined thermodynamic arrow of time. The final
state need not be of low entropy, but it must, for the
purposes of our argument, have some regularities. The
observers must be able to detect and exploit features of
the final state which allow them to identify ensembles of
quantum systems that are pre-selected and post-selected
in such a way as to alter the standard outcome probabil-
ities predicted on the basis of pre-selection alone. As we
will show, it is easy to construct examples of time-neutral
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cosmologies in which this necessary condition holds.
Any discussion of quantum theory in the context of cos-
mology goes outside the Copenhagen framework, and so
raises difficult interpretational questions. GMH interpret
their time-neutral cosmological models via the consistent
histories formulation of quantum cosmology. [2] We focus
here on the observational implications for standard qua-
siclassical observers (such as, hypothetically, ourselves)
in a time-neutral cosmology, which allows us to leave
aside most interpretational questions. Instead of consid-
ering all the infinitely many incompatible consistent sets
defined by GMH, we suppose, as part of the definition
of a time-neutral cosmological model, that one partic-
ular quasiclassical consistent set S has been fixed. All
statements about quasiclassical events — the actions of
observers, their manipulations of their experimental ap-
paratus, and their observations — are statements which
should in principle be understood in terms of quasiclas-
sical variables defined by that fixed set.1
So, the full cosmological theory is defined by initial
and final states, ρi and ρf , which are non-orthogonal
positive semi-definite matrices, and the specified qua-
siclassical consistent set of histories S. We implicitly
require also some theory of the hamiltonian and speci-
fication of canonical variables which allows us to make
physical sense of the events abstractly specified in S —
allowing us, for example, to interpret suitable projections
P on Hilbert space in terms of local number density op-
erators integrated over small regions, and so to interpret
the statement that P is realised as the statement that
the density d of matter in a certain specified volume lies
in the range dmin ≤ d ≤ dmax.
The probabilities for particular quasiclassical events —
for example, a given observer pressing the switch of a sig-
nalling device — are now, in principle, calculable from
the boundary conditions by the standard decoherence
functional probability formula. [2]
A comment on free will is necessary at this point.
When we press a switch, it generally seems to us that
we could have chosen not to.2 If our pressing a switch is
reliably correlated with someone else receiving a message
— in such a way that we can give a direct physical expla-
nation of the fact that the message will be received if and
only if we press the switch — then we describe ourselves
as sending a signal by the action of pressing the switch.
This is the operational definition used in this paper when,
for example, we speak about an observer choosing to send
a signal. We will show that time-neutral cosmological
models in which the final state has a detectable regular-
ity supply a mechanism by which intelligent observers can
construct devices which allow them — in this operational
sense — to send superluminal signals.
One can imagine pathological cosmological models in
which, via some conspiracy of the boundary conditions,
it is pre-determined that observer A will press a switch
a number of times, and that observer B will receive a
message at correlated times, although there is no direct
physical link between the switch and the message. Such
coincidences have no simple physical explanation: they
can only be understood from a detailed analysis of the
boundary conditions. It cannot then be said that press-
ing the switch causes the message to be received, in the
conventional sense. As will be seen, pathologies of this
sort are not invoked here.
We suppose that the specific quasiclassical events to
be discussed occur in a small, flat region of space-time in
roughly our own cosmological era — near the earth, in
the near future, for example. We suppose too that (as
is generally believed) the simplest non-relativistic ver-
sion of the consistent histories formalism adequately de-
scribes localised quasiclassical physics: i.e., we take phys-
ical events to be defined by projections at given times in
some fixed frame,
That is, we assume that some partial and coarse-
grained quasiclassical history H , built from basic events
in S, and sufficient to describe the evolution of the clas-
sical structure of the universe up to the present, has al-
ready been realised. All subsequent probabilities should
now, in principle, be calculated by conditioning on the
realisation of H . To avoid the need for this, we consider
events defined by interactions of pre- and post-selected
quantum subsystems with classical measuring devices,
and assume that the subsystems are uncorrelated with
the quasiclassical degrees of freedom at all times between
the initial condition and their first measurement, and
again between their final measurement and the final con-
dition.
III. SUPERLUMINAL SIGNALLING
A single example suffices to show that time-neutral cos-
mologies are not immune from superluminal signalling.
It is hard to make the example very realistic, for several
1We assume here familiarity with the consistent histories
approach to quantum cosmology. For reviews, attempts at a
definition of quasiclassicality, and discussions of the problems
see, for example, Refs. [2–5].
2Whether or not this impression of free choice is justifiable
is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper!
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reasons. First, neither quantum cosmology nor quantum
gravity are well understood. Second, there is no precise
mathematical definition of quasiclassicality. Third, no
detailed proposals for plausible time-neutral cosmologies
have been made. Indeed, while time-neutral quantum
theory itself is certainly consistent, it is less clear that
time-neutral cosmological models with the specific prop-
erties that GMH consider [6] are consistent with present
theories and observations.3 We can, however, produce
an example of superluminal signalling under assumptions
which, while contrived, are not excluded by any theoret-
ical principle.
Suppose that the cosmology can be divided into two
subsystems, which interact only briefly. The first sub-
system includes an entire quasiclassical realm, containing
observers, their measuring devices, and all the large-scale
cosmological structure. It is to be described by some con-
sistent set S, which is sufficiently detailed to describe the
actions of the observers and the experiments they carry
out. We can assume that this realm, the observers and
their experimental devices are very like our own, us and
ours.
The second subsystem is a large supply of pairs of ini-
tially entangled particles initially in a singlet spin state
|B〉 = 1/
√
2(| ↑〉L| ↓〉R − | ↓〉L| ↑〉R)
where the states | ↑〉 and | ↓〉 are the ± 1
2
eigenstates of
σz , for a choice of the z axis which is unambiguously de-
fined by parallel transport throughout their propagation.
These pairs are otherwise initially uncorrelated with each
other and with the rest of the quasiclassical realm.
The pairs of particles propagate freely from the begin-
ning of the cosmology, undergoing no significant interac-
tions, with the L and R particles propagating in distinct
directions, until they arrive at two regions populated by
experimentalists. The experimentalists have set up mea-
suring devices, which register the arrival of each particle
and measure its spin, about some axis or other — the axes
are initially altered quite often by the experimentalists,
as they attempt to investigate the ensemble statistics for
various choices of axes. Their measurements are idealised
von Neumann measurements, so that the standard ABL
time-neutral probability formula applies.
The particles arrive sequentially pair by pair: i.e the
first particles to arrive at each apparatus are entangled,
as are the second and every successive pair. These arrival
events have a large spacelike separation. After a single
measurement, they propagate freely off into empty space,
never again undergoing any significant interaction until
the end of the cosmology. At this point, they satisfy the
final condition that the R particles are found, with cer-
tainty, in the state | ↑〉R; the final state of the L particles
is not constrained.
The full initial state for the cosmology is thus ρi ⊗
ρB ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρB, where ρB = |B〉〈B| describes an initially
Bell-entangled pair. The density matrix ρi describes the
initial conditions from which the rest of the quasiclas-
sical realm emerges. The full final state, similarly, is
ρf ⊗ ρ′ ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρ′, where ρ′ = IL ⊗ | ↑〉R〈↑ |R, and IL is
the identity operator on the left hand particle spin. In
both cases, the other degrees of freedom describing the
initial states have been omitted. The precise choice of
the density matrix ρf , which describes the final state of
the rest of the quasiclassical realm, is unimportant.
The experimentalists exchange all their data via clas-
sical signals, and search for correlations in those data.
Familiar with ABL quantum theory, they eventually cor-
rectly conclude that the pairs they observe are pre- and
post-selected to arrive in the state ρB and to reach the
final state ρ′.
As they realise, these conditions mean that the out-
come probabilities for the experimenters on the left de-
pend on the axes chosen by the experimenters on the
right. For instance, if the experimenters on the right
choose the z axis, the post-selection implies that they
will, with probability one, obtain the eigenvalue + 1
2
. If
the experimenters on the left also choose the z axis for
the corresponding particle, they will also, with probabil-
ity one, obtain the eigenvalue − 1
2
. On the other hand,
if the experimenters on the right choose the x axis, they
will have probability 1
2
of finding their particle in either
of the possible spin eigenstates. The left hand exper-
imenters, if they still choose the z axis, will then also
have probability 1
2
of finding the corresponding particle
in either eigenstate.
The experimenters now use classical signals to agree a
superluminal signalling protocol for future use. For the
right hand experimenters to send a 0, they choose the z
axis for their observations on an agreed sequence of m
particles. To send a 1, they choose the x axis for the
same sequence of particles. The left hand experimenters
always choose the z axis for their observations. If they
obtain the eigenvalue − 1
2
for each of them particles, they
record a 0; if not, they record a 1.
This is clearly a probabilistic (and not optimally effi-
cient) protocol: the probability, 2−m, of misreading a 1
as a 0 is small for large m, but cannot be made to van-
ish. Nonetheless, if the spacelike separation is large com-
pared with the interval between the arrival of successive
3A thoughtful discussion of some of the problems that arise
in defining GMH time-neutral cosmologies can be found in
Ref. [7].
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particles, the protocol allows long messages to be sent su-
perluminally and very reliably. In information theoretic
terms, [8] the information transmitted superluminally is
non-zero and can be made arbitrarily close to one bit by
taking m large. Standard causality is thus violated.
This signalling protocol will work only under the speci-
fied conditions. Actions of the experimenters or later ob-
servers could frustrate it. If the particles re-interact with
the quasiclassical world after the first measurement, the
outcome probabilities will be altered, and the signalling
will not necessarily work.
There is no contradiction here, however. The assump-
tions made in the example correspond to a possible cos-
mology. If, according to the initial and final conditions
of that cosmology, the experimenters are bound — in all
histories of the set S — to carry out precisely one ob-
servation on each particle in each pair, and to allow the
particles to propagate unhindered, then the protocol will
work. If these assumptions hold true in some histories
of the set, the protocol will work if the realised history
is one of those, and will not necessarily work otherwise.
There is no reason why it should be true, in a general
cosmology, that the probability of the assumptions be-
ing satisfied is large, or even non-zero. However, we may
(and do) consider some realised history in some particu-
lar cosmology in which they do, in fact, hold.
Whatever the details of the cosmology, any time-
neutral theory of GMH type, together with the speci-
fication of some consistent quasiclassical set, will unam-
biguously assign probabilities to possible histories in a
logically consistent way. Thus, although the theories al-
low superluminal signalling, there is no possibility of set-
ting up a paradoxical causal loop in a way which leads
to an internal contradiction: some internally consistent
outcome will be realised. In standard superluminal sig-
nalling paradoxes, a signaller can send signals into his
own past light cone, and one can imagine things being
arranged so that the subsequent transmission of the sig-
nals then becomes impossible — by, for example, killing
the signallers’ grandfather as a child. [9] Such paradoxes
break down here because the probabilistic predictions in
a time-neutral model are context-dependent. Superlumi-
nal signalling devices can have efficiency arbitrarily close
to one in isolation, but if a paradoxical causal loop is
set up involving such devices, at least one device will fail
to function — not through any mysterious intervention
or because of any ad hoc postulate, but as a result of
the standard probability rules of the consistent histories
formalism.
Nor is there any violation of Lorentz invariance in any
standard sense: the theory itself picks out no preferred
frame, and its predictions can equally well be calculated
in any frame.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that GMH time-neutral cosmologies can
allow superluminal signalling, given knowledge of a de-
tectable regularity in the final state — knowledge which
can be empirically obtained by observers in those cos-
mologies.
The example given is admittedly contrived. However,
the possibility of superluminal signalling in these cos-
mologies is more general. Any final state with interesting
regularities is liable to allow superluminal signalling. For
the above argument to go through, all that is required
is that, at some point in a realised history, ensembles
of entangled pairs of quantum subsystems can be pro-
duced in which at least one member of the pair, if left
to propagate freely, would, as a result of post-selection,
have a propensity to end up in some particular one of the
entangled eigenstates.
For example, the time-neutral cosmologies GMH dis-
cuss involve the formation of large-scale structure at both
ends of the universe. It is, admittedly, hard to prove any
rigorous result about the properties of such cosmologies.
However, if they can actually be realised, it seems clear
that, from the perspective of observers nearer (what they
regard as) the initial state, there should be a propen-
sity for matter eventually to propagate into the stars and
galaxies formed in the time-reversed sense at the other
end of the cosmology, in a way which eventually must
result in a detectable deviation from the predictions of
the time asymmetric quantum theory defined by the ini-
tial state alone. It should then be possible to use this
propensity to construct superluminal signalling devices
of the type described above, by using pairs of particles
entangled in position space.
Paradox is avoided as the probability that any signal is
successfully transmitted is context-dependent. Signalling
devices, however reliable when operated in isolation, will
generally become unreliable if any paradoxical loop is at-
tempted. Though superluminal signalling is usually seen
as a fatal flaw, it causes no inconsistency in time-neutral
cosmologies.
Of course, there are independent reasons to approach
GMH time-neutral cosmologies with scepticism. The hy-
pothesis that initial causes suffice seems very well estab-
lished. Also, the evidence appears to lean against a closed
universe, and a closed universe is the natural cosmologi-
cal setting for time-neutral models,
Still, it seems clear that the reason why standard quan-
tum theory respects Minkowski space causality — in the
sense that it does not allow superluminal signalling —
is not quite as usually suggested. It is not absolutely
necessary to forbid superluminal signalling in order to
maintain the internal consistency of a relativistic quan-
tum theory. The impossibility of superluminal signalling
is, rather, ultimately a hypothesis, contingent on the fact
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that naturally occurring ensembles can be identified on
the basis of pre-selection alone.
Price has recently suggested [10] that backward and
forward causation could in principle simultaneously be
present in a well-defined physical theory. It follows from
the discussion above that this is indeed a property of
suitable time-neutral cosmological theories. To explain
the sense in which this is so, we need first to say some-
thing about the language of causality in standard time
asymmetric theories.4
As mentioned above, according to essentially all cur-
rent physical theories, our actions are in principle prob-
abilistically predictable from the boundary conditions.
Nonetheless, it is generally regarded as useful to employ
the language of causality in describing of our actions —
to say, for example, that we are able to causally influ-
ence the future, but not the past. Various justifications
are given. It is sometimes intended that causes and ef-
fects are to be distinguished by the asymmetry of their
correlations. Many independent future effects are gener-
ally correlated with, and can be traced to, a single cause.
If, for example, we send an ordinary radio signal, it may
be received and acted upon by many people in the future.
Causal statements about the consequences of our own ac-
tions can also be meant simply as statements about our
own perspective on the world. It appears to us that we
have a free choice to send the signal or not, and that
the events which follow from our sending the signal are
contingent on and caused by our exercising the choice to
send it.
In either of these conventional senses, when time-
neutral cosmological theories allow superluminal sig-
nalling, they generally allow bidirectional causation.5
Agents in those theories who, from their perspective,
have evolved to causally influence the future, can also
causally influence the past, for example by setting up
two or more superluminal signalling devices connected in
such a way as to send signals into their past light cone
— when, that is, the boundary conditions allow such
constructions, and some boundary conditions certainly
do. Again, though, the past can never be influenced in
a way which will lead to contradictions — it is always
impossible, for example, for agents to undo their present
observations by acting on the past.
Finally, the fact that time-neutral theories allow super-
luminal signalling may have interesting implications for
discussions of the properties of other non-standard vari-
ants of quantum theory. It is often suggested that non-
relativistic theories which allow superluminal signalling
— for example, non-linear generalisations of quantum
mechanics — cannot possibly have a consistent relativis-
tic extension. While this may indeed be true in specific
cases of interest, some further argument is clearly needed:
the demonstration of superluminal signalling is not suffi-
cient per se.
Of course, one can always argue that theories which al-
low superluminal signalling should be rejected on grounds
of aesthetics or by Ockham’s razor. The discussion above,
which is solely concerned with the logical relations among
physical hypotheses, provides no counter-argument here.
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